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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines civilian oversight of the police in 
the 50 largest U. S. cities. Data on the nature and 
organization of civilian oversight was collected via phone 
surveys. Local mandates on civilian oversight were obtained 
through mailed-in responses (i.e., statutes, ordinances, and 
annual reports).
The present research was utilized to determine the 
prevalence, trends, and variety of civilian review of the 
police. A classification schemata was developed which 
categorized civilian oversight agencies into one of three 
classes. Pursuant to this research, it was discovered that 
the majority (60%) of the 50 largest cities have some form of 
civilian review. Based on the findings, results were combined 
to show generalities among civilian oversight agencies, while 
simultaneously detailing other differences specific to these 
agencies.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Problem
The problem addressed by this thesis concerns the 
prevalence and variety of civilian oversight agencies in the 
United States. This thesis establishes a classification 
system which permits meaningful evaluation of civilian 
oversight of the police. By focusing on civilian oversight 
agencies in the 50 largest U. S. cities, prevalence, variety, 
and trends can be discussed with more clarity.
Research Question. How prevalent are civilian oversight
agencies in the United States, and 
how can they be distinguished from 
one another?
Definition of Terms
Much confusion exists concerning the terminology used in 
discussing civilian oversight. Throughout this thesis 
"civilian oversight" and "civilian review" will be used 
interchangeablely. vCivilian oversight refers to any procedure 
whereby a non-sworn individual or a body consisting of non­
sworn individuals investigate and/or review allegations of 
police misconduct and make subsequent recommendations. An 
"independent" investigation or review refers to procedures 
conducted by civilians not responsible to the police agency; 
this type of review is most commonly called "external" review.
Therefore, "internal" review refers to procedures where sworn 
officers conduct reviewing processes.
External review of the police is a direct response to a 
perception of continuing police misconduct. Proponents of 
civilian review question the internal mechanisms that have 
been the traditional forum for handling police misconduct 
cases (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967). Civilian oversight agencies 
have been proposed as one possible alternative to curbing 
police abuses.
Research Objective
To date, research in the field of criminal justice has 
failed to provide an adequate understanding of civilian 
oversight of the police. Although there has been at least one 
notable attempt to develop a classification system 
(Kerstetter, 1985), many questions remain unanswered—  
questions that must be answered before researchers can explain 
the dramatic growth in the area of civilian oversight during 
the last decade. These questions concern the nature of police 
work, evidence of police misconduct, and recommendations 
offered to increase police efficiency.
Since 60 percent of the 50 largest U. S. cities have a 
civilian oversight agency of some variety, much can be learned 
by comparing these agencies. Developing a classification 
system that is all-inclusive is the first step in discussing
3civilian oversight in an informed manner.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a descriptive 
analysis of civilian oversight agencies in the 50 largest 
U. S. cities. Civilian oversight agencies will be designated 
as being in one of the three classifications this thesis will 
establish. Differences in oversight agencies will then be 
discussed respective to the different classes and comparisons 
will be made (e.g., method of appointment, enabling 
authorization, types of cases reviewed, etc.).
The significance of this research will be to provide a 
foundation for studying civilian oversight agencies in a more 
systematic and comprehensive manner. Data will also be 
outlined concerning the general characteristics of cities 
where oversight agencies exist. Factors such as the population 
of the city, the racial composition of the city, the police- 
citizen ratio, and the geographical location of the 
city/agency will be compared across the cities in the sample. 
Systematic data to be outlined may aid researchers and 
scholars in answering some of the more qualitative questions 
concerning civilian oversight, questions such as, (a) are 
civilian oversight agencies effective mechanisms for 
controlling police misconduct, (b) how do we evaluate the 
effectiveness of civilian oversight organizations, and (c) are 
civilian oversight agencies aimed primarily at controlling
4police misconduct or at restoring public confidence in the 
police?
5CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
Since civilian review of the police is a response to 
police misconduct, to understand police misconduct, first, 
police behavior must be placed in the context of routine 
police duties. Second, the citizen complaints system must be 
reviewed from a historical perspective, detailing the 
specifics by which traditional complaint systems have become 
subject to great criticism. Three key questions must be 
addressed in this review concerning the emergence of civilian 
review of the police: (1) what is the true nature of police
work; (2) what evidence is there of police misconduct; and (3) 
why has the traditional citizen complaint system for handling 
complaints of citizens become subject to criticism?
Police Work and Behavior
The commonly used motto that the police are "to serve and 
to protect" does little to define the true nature of police 
work. The above phrase suggests that police work can be 
neatly put into two rather broad categories. According to 
Reiss (1971), law enforcement officers are required to handle 
a wide range of problems that arise in the everyday lives of 
citizens in any given community. Police researchers have 
primarily used calls for police service and observations of
6police on patrol in order to analyze what police do on the job 
(Reiss, 1971? National Institute of Justice, 1984) . In 
discussing the nature of police work utilizing service calls 
and actual patrol observations, two crucial areas of interest 
can be addressed— citizen expectations of the police and 
police behavior on the streets.
In The Police and the Public. Albert Reiss (1971) made 
the first systematic attempt to describe the nature of police 
work in America. Reiss examined 6,172 calls for service 
received in a 24-hour period at the Chicago Police Department 
in April of 1966. Reiss then categorized the calls for 
service into four broad categories (request on criminal 
matters, request for assistance, complaints about police 
service, and police information calls) (p. 71).
Reiss used actual observations of officers on patrol in 
Washington, DC, Boston, and Chicago in the summer of 1966. In 
a seven week period, hired observers reported on 5,3 60 
mobilizations of the police (police mobilizations refer to any 
time an officer was dispatched to a situation or when the 
officer himself initiated an encounter with a citizen) (Reiss, 
1971? p. xiii). Thirty-six observers were divided equally to 
high crime precincts in Boston, Washington DC, and Chicago. 
The primary purpose of Reiss1 study was to uncover the true 
nature of police work— what did police actually do on a daily 
basis while patrolling (Reiss, 1973? p. 12)?
7While citizens defined the majority of their complaints 
as criminal in nature, the patrol observations made by Reiss 
suggested that most police-citizen encounters involved non­
criminal matters, incidents in which police personnel observed 
no clear violation of the law. Reiss discovered that around 
8 0 percent of incidents responded to by the Chicago Police 
Department involved such things as requests for information, 
medical assistance, reports of traffic hazards, missing 
persons reports, and unsatisfactory police performance. Also, 
various administrative functions accounted for police activity 
on patrol (Reiss, 1971; p. 71).
The contrast between what citizens regard as criminal and 
what the police regard as criminal presents problems in 
interpreting the nature of police work (Reiss, 1971). Three 
factors that may explain some of the disagreement involve 
citizens* often-vague understanding of what is criminal and 
what is not, the great degree of police discretion in police- 
citizen encounters, and the fact that the police officer 
ultimately labels the encounter. Given the preceding 
differences of what is perceived to be criminal, the 
proportion of criminal to non-criminal encounters may be 
slightly more equal, but clearly, the police role as a 
"peacekeeper" outweighs the "crimefighter role" (Reiss, 1971).
Reiss (1971) found that the majority of police work 
involved reactive, as opposed to proactive policing.
Proactive policing refers to the occasion when the policeman 
himself initiates the contact with a citizen. Around 80 
percent of all policing was found to be reactive with the 
officer being summoned to the location usually by telephone or 
dispatch and less often by police initiated contacts (p. 71) .
The Police Services Study (PSS), conducted from 1974-80, 
was a replication of Reiss' work. It incorporated important 
changes in methodology that make the PSS a much more reliable 
research endeavor. Twenty-one different police departments in 
three metropolitan areas were observed during the PSS. The 
twenty-one departments covered a wide variety of police 
organizations, including urban and rural, high crime and low 
crime areas, small and large populated areas, and areas with 
various income levels (National Institute of Justice, 1984; p. 
177) .
As in Reiss' research, trained observers were distributed 
across selected cities. The PSS utilized over 60
neighborhoods in 21 different cities, whereas Reiss had used 
nine high crime areas in three heavily populated cities. 
Altogether the PSS used 5,688 police-citizen encounters 
involving more than 10,000 citizens. Nine-hundred shifts were 
observed and 650 variables were recorded (e.g., how encounter 
was initiated, location of incident, police response time, 
length of encounter, police/citizen actions and demeanor, etc) 
(National Institute of Justice, 1984? p. 177). The PSS
represents the most extensive study to-date of police services 
in America.
The PSS contained more than just the two sources of data 
mentioned. Phase I of the project was a census of all law 
enforcement agencies in the United States (local, state, and 
federal). Phase II of the project utilized police calls for 
service and observations of police patrol. Additional sources 
of data included: 1) in-person interviews with police
officers, supervisors, and administrators? 2) in-depth 
interviews with police administrators; 3) personal interviews 
with representatives of citizen organizations; 4) interviews 
with public officials; 5) personal interviews with 
representatives of citizen organizations; 6) interviews with 
public officials involved in public policy-making? and, 7) 
surveys of neighborhood residents (National Institute of 
Justice, 1984? p. 178). The reported findings of the PSS 
focuses on calls for service and patrol observations. 
Thirteen categories of calls for service were established. 
The categories were as follows:
(a) Non-violent crime— non-personal injury or property 
loss;
(b) Traffic problem— dangerous or illegal operation of 
a motor vehicle, motor vehicle accident, or public 
hazard;
(c) Assistance— all situations other than the above 
where citizen requests or appears in need of help?
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(d) Public nuisance— unpleasant or annoying
circumstances ?
(e) General informational request;
(f) Interpersonal conflict— persons involved in a 
dispute? violence may be present but no criminal 
liability is evident?
(g) Suspicious circumstances— circumstances about which 
there is great uncertainty, but threatening?
(h) Medical problem— injured or ill persons in need of 
help ?
(i) Dependent person— persons unable to care for 
themselves;
(j) Violent crime— bodily injury or threat thereof? 
cases involving criminal liability?
(k) Information for police— persons providing
information concerning crime or other problems;
(1) Public morals crime— an affront to legal standards? 
and,
(m) Internal police operations— no direct service to 
citizen (e.g., administrative tasks, internal legal 
procedures) (National Institute of Justice, 198? p. 
28) .
Despite the differences in methodology, the PSS data
confirmed most of the findings on the nature of police work 
provided by Reiss' earlier study (National Institute of
Justice, 1984). Data from the PSS revealed that police work 
was primarily reactive as opposed to proactive and that most 
police encounters involved matters of a noncriminal nature. 
A breakdown of calls for service by the different categories 
reflected the following percentages of all calls for service 
in the 21 different police departments: 1) violent crimes— 2
11
percent, 2) non-violent crimes— 17 percent, 3) interpersonal 
conflicts— 7 percent, 4) medical assistance— 3 percent, 5) 
traffic problems— 9 percent, 6) dependent persons— 3 percent, 
7) public nuisances— 11 percent, 8) suspicious circumstances—  
5 percent, 9) assistance— 12 percent, 10) citizen request for 
information— 21 percent, 11) citizen providing information— 8 
percent, and 12) internal operations requests— 2 percent 
(National Institute of Justice, 1984; p.28).
Data from both the PSS and Reiss' observations converge 
on the nature of police work. It seems that police duties, by 
and large, have little to do with actual crime fighting, but 
they are expected to do a wide variety of functions where they 
are in constant contact with citizens. This contact with the 
community can cause special problems where, in some instances, 
the police may act inappropriately. The next section of this 
paper will deal with research in the area of police 
misconduct.
Police Misconduct
With regard to Reiss' study, observers were specifically 
asked to report on each instance of police use of force and to 
categorize it as necessary or unnecessary. Minor incidents 
that involved simple restraint, such as holding an offender's 
arm down were excluded from analysis. Reiss included only 
cases where a policeman struck a suspect with his hands, fist, 
feet, body, or when he used a weapon of some type (Reiss,
12
1973; p. 12). Force used against an individual by an officer 
was labeled unnecessary if it was used in one of the following 
methods:
1) If the officer struck a citizen and 
didn't effect an arrest?
2) where the individual involved, by word or 
deed, offered no resistance?
3) where the officer, facing some resistance, 
could have attempted to control the situation 
in an alternate manner short of physical 
force?
4) where other officers were present and 
could have rendered assistance?
5) where the individual was handcuffed and 
made no attempt to resist or flee? and,
6) where the citizen resisted but the use of
force continued after the situation was under
control (Reiss, 1973? p. 12).
Patrol observations from the three cities cited 37 
instances where force had been judged unnecessary based on the 
six criteria established. Data revealed that the police had 
used unnecessary force against 44 citizens (in some instances 
force was used against more than one citizen during a police 
encounter) . Furthermore, no one was arrested in 15 of the 
cases, and of these cases eight involved encounters where no 
physical or verbal resistance was indicated (Reiss, 197 3; p. 
12). Observers reported in detail on 11,255 encounters 
involving citizens in one of the three cities. Reiss reported
that the actual instances where police officers used
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unnecessary force in all three cities were relatively low in 
proportion to the total number of encounters daily; only about 
3 encounters in every 1,000 involved the use of unnecessary 
force (Reiss, 1971; p. 142), but nevertheless, police 
misconduct constituted a real problem in policing (Reiss, 
1973; 170). Reiss concluded that police misconduct
constituted a more substantial problem due to the fact that 
complaints tend to accumulate over time. Misconduct directed 
toward citizens in this sense may become considerable in 
volume when observing annual rates. (Reiss, 1971; p. 170).
Reiss' study of misconduct had certain limitations. 
First, he only used one police department (Chicago) in his 
observations of calls for police service. It could very well 
be that the Chicago Police Department was significantly 
different from other departments in the way service calls were 
handled. Secondly, Reiss observed calls for a 24-hour period, 
a longer observation period could have affected his results. 
Finally by choosing high crime areas in each of the three 
cities, Reiss may have provided a non-representative picture 
of police-citizen encounters. Certainly high crime areas in 
themselves would greatly affect the potential for officers to 
become engaged in particularly violent encounters with 
citizens, especially since these high crime areas in the three 
cities were places where racial riots and disturbances caused 
additional negative confrontations between the police and the
public. On the positive side, Reiss* observations provide a 
rich body of information on citizen expectations of the 
police. Citizens expect the police to provide a variety of 
services that have little to do with crime-fighting. 
Additionally, Reiss* research confirms that police officers do 
not always act within the confines of the law (Reiss, 1971; p. 
156) .
Both the Kerner Commission (1968) and the President*s 
Crime Commission (1967) as well as various other researchers 
have clearly noted special problems with police-community 
relations in large urban areas (Reiss, 1971? Chevigny, 1969). 
Chevigny (19 69) studied police abuse of force in New York 
City. Chevigny found that 55 percent of all citizen 
complaints alleging excessive force involved defiance of some 
variety on the part of the citizen. Chevigny1s study revealed 
that nearly all acts of police brutality were followed by the 
offender being arrested and charged with resisting arrest 
along with the original offense. Chevigny found that acts of 
force by police officers often occurred after the citizen 
verbally offended the officer (Chevigny, 1969).
^ — /^Police misconduct covers various aspects of police 
behavior on the street? police use of unnecessary or 
unwarranted physical force is only one part of the picture. 
Both Chevigny (1969) and Reiss (1973) noted instances were 
officers used racial slurs and harassed certain "deviant**
15
classes of citizens (e.g., drunks, prostitutes, and the 
homeless). Also, instances have been observed were policemen 
have harassed young citizens assembled in public areas 
(Chevigny, 1969). The police misconduct dilemma has focused 
on the misuse of force because other contentions are usually
harder to prove because they cannot be' easily substantiated,
due to the lack of physical evidence (Wagner, 198 0).
Public Perceptions of the Police
Historically, public opinion seems to present a different 
picture of law enforcement than what is suggested by police 
misconduct research. It seems that over time the overwhelming 
majority of the public has had a high regard for the police. 
A 1966 poll by the National Opinion Research Center found that 
only 8 percent of those polled thought the police were doing 
a poor job. Other responses were distributed between fair 
(24%) , good (45%), and excellent (22%) . Both the Gallup Poll 
(1965) and the Louis Harris Poll (1966) revealed that the 
majority of the citizens held the police in high esteem. 
Furthermore, the public believed that the police do not engage 
in serious misconduct. In 1965, only 9 percent of Americans 
believed that there was police brutality (Presidents 
Commission of Law Enforcement and the Administration of 
Justice, 1967? p. 145).
fjfc Although surveys show high performance ratings for the 
police, nonwhite respondents, particularly blacks, have
16
consistently rated the police somewhat lower. The National 
Opinion Research Center (1966) found that lower ratings on the 
part of nonwhites existed across all income levels and was not 
significantly related to socioeconomic status. The Lou Harris 
Poll (1966) revealed that 51 percent of blacks, compared to 67 
percent of whites, believed the police to be doing a good or 
excellent job. These public opinion polls also suggest that 
citizens below the age of 35, especially males, are most 
critical of the police— making young, black males the most 
critical (Presidents Commission of Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 146).
7f Current data on public attitudes toward the police reveal 
that little has changed since the polls of the mid-1960s. In 
a 1988 Gallup poll, public attitudes toward the police were 
relatively high with 47 percent of the respondents rating the 
police (in regard to job performance) high or very high. Only 
11 percent rated the police as low or very low— the remaining 
42 percent indicated that the police were average. 
Differences, however, appear when race is examined. The data 
reveal that both blacks and nonwhites in general have lower 
opinions of the police. Similar polls throughout the 1970s 
reported similar observations (U.S. Department of Justice, 
1989) . Data throughout the 1970s and 1980s suggests that there 
has been little variation over time in public attitudes 
concerning the police.
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Commissions on Policing
Although the public perception of the police is quite 
positive, several studies sponsored by the federal government 
have found police brutality, or at least the perception of 
brutality, to be a grave problem in America. The National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham 
Commission), formed by President Hoover in 1931, found 
considerable evidence of police misconduct. Likewise, 
President Truman's Commission on Civil Rights came to similar 
conclusions (President's Commission of Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967).
The President's Crime Commission (1967) cited abuses in 
some cities which ranged from minor discourtesy to the clear 
use of unnecessary force. It was also found that a number of 
officers treated citizens in discriminatory ways often 
employing the use of profanity. One of the Commission's 
studies involved 100 routine contacts with citizens in several 
different cities. The majority of those interviewed 
concerning certain incidents were witnesses, bystanders, or 
victims as opposed to suspects. The study revealed that 
around 60 percent of the sample were interrogated without a 
proper introduction from the officer, and 15 percent were 
interrogated with derogatory or profane language being used by 
the officer (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 180). The Crime
Commission also cited the use of racial slurs used against 
citizens by the police. The Crime Commission concluded that 
while police misconduct is not frequent, certain acts 
witnessed could not be tolerated no matter how infrequent they 
occur (Presidents Commission of Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 181). Although the Crime 
Commission Report regarding police misconduct and police- 
community relations was structured in a less systematic nature 
than other studies (e.g., Reiss, 1971; National Institute of 
Justice, 1984), the Commission did affirm a need for police 
reform.
fIn ^ 'report'to the National Commission On The Causes and 
Prevention of Violence (1967), Campbell, stressing the 
importance of improving police-community relations, stated:
[The “police are, “indeed, prejudiced against 
minorities. And the minority groups are 
equally prejudiced against the police. The 
prejudice on both sides is not without some 
foundation. The views of each side toward the 
other are constantly being reinforced^and have 
become self-fulfilling prophesiesPj Doing 
something about the problem is what is called 
•improving police-community relations1 
(Campbell et al., 1970; p 299).
The President's Crime Commission (1967) cited several 
ways of improving police behavior and police-community 
relations by attempting to make policing more professional. 
The Commission viewed the betterment of police-community 
relations as serving two primary functions. First, all
19
efforts at professionalizing law enforcement agencies would 
aid in restoring public confidence in the police— or rather 
extending existing public confidence to minorities. Second, 
the commission viewed public hostility on the part of the 
police and citizens as detrimental to police field operations. 
The Commission stated, "it may make officers reluctant to act; 
it may also induce the use of unnecessary force, verbal abuse, 
or other improper practices (Presidents Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 145)".
The Kerner Commission (1968) also reported on the deep 
hostility between the police and citizens in American cities. 
The Kerner Commission studied civil disorders in American 
cities (primarily racial riots). Many instances of police 
misconduct were confirmed, but it was also noted that these 
instances do not constitute the normal pattern of police work 
or behavior (National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders, 
1968).. Again the Kerner Commission restated the conclusion of 
the Crime Commission in stating that police brutality, no 
matter how infrequent, is something that cannot be tolerated 
(National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders, 1968; p. 
160) . The Kerner Commission relied on studies and surveys 
conducted by the President’s Crime Commission (1967) and 
confirmed instances of police misconduct and therefore cited
20
five problem areas:
1) The need or change in police operations in the 
ghetto, to insure proper conduct by individual 
officers and to eliminate abrasive practices;
2) The need for more adequate police protection for 
ghetto residents, to eliminate the present high 
sense of insecurity to person and property;
3) The need for effective mechanisms for 
resolving citizen grievances against the 
police;
4) The need for policy guidelines to assist 
police in areas where police conduct can 
create tension; and,
5) The need to develop community support for law 
enforcement (National Advisory Committee On 
Civil Disorders, 1968; p. 158).
The Kerner Commission made a series of recommendations in 
the five areas. Concerning patrol practices, the Commission 
recommended that officers with bad reputations among minority 
residents be immediately reassigned to other areas; that 
screening procedures should be adhered to where officers with 
superior ability, sensitivity, and common sense be assigned to 
minority neighborhoods; and that incentives should be 
developed rewarding officers for exemplary performance in 
minority neighborhoods (National Advisory Committee on Civil 
Disorders, 1968; p. 166). The Commission also recommended the 
following objectives aimed at improving police performance:
1) policies of enforcement in ghetto should be 
clear and consistent with other areas;
2) efforts should be made to distribute officers 
according to where they are most needed;
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3) departments should make efforts to actively
recruit blacks;
4) departments should develop policy guidelines
involving the handling, of disputes and 
especially deadly force; and
5) departments should develop strong
investigative units to monitor officer 
compliance with policies and procedures 
(National Advisory Committee On Civil 
Disorders, 1968; pp. 166-67).
The Kerner Commission made recommendations on the proper 
handling of citizen complaints against the police that went 
beyond those of the President’s Crime Commission. For 
example, the President's Crime Commission (1967) had
recommended that police precincts utilize city-wide citizen 
advisory committees, including minority leaders, to
periodically meet with the police organization and that 
efforts should be made in handling citizen complaints through 
departmental channels that reflect real officer discipline 
(Campbell et al., 1970). The Kerner Commission was somewhat 
more direct in its recommendations concerning citizen 
grievance mechanisms. The recommendations were as follows:
1) Making a complaint should be easy; citizens 
should be allowed to file formal grievances 
through other community agencies as well as 
the police organization. Also forms used in 
filing complaints should be straight forward 
and easy to understand;
2) The grievance procedure should have a built-in 
conciliation process attempting resolve 
complaint barring a full investigation;
22
jr3) The complaining party should be a participate
in the investigative process and should be 
kept fully informed until the final outcome;
4) Complaints concerning departmental policies
should be directed toward appropriate
departmental units were additional training if 
needed can be given; and,
%"5) A specialized agency, with adequate funds and
staff, should be created separate from other 
municipal agencies, to handle, investigate and 
to make recommendations on citizen complaint 
(National Advisory Committee On Civil 
Disorders, 1968; p. 163).
Both the Kerner Commission (1968) as well as the
President's Crime Commission (1967) viewed the citizen 
complaints system as inadequate. While the President's Crime 
Commission had simply advocated a reorganization of the
complaint procedures to ensure equity, the Kerner Commission
believed that an agency independent of the police organization 
would be better equipped to handle citizen complaints against 
the police. For the first time a federal commission had 
advocated external review of police misconduct allegations 
(National Advisory Committee On Civil Disorders, 1968). 
Citizen Complaint Procedures
As many studies have shown, American policing has had a 
long history of corruption and abuse of authority dating back 
to the first decade of formalized policing (President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of 
Justice, 1967). By the 1960s, police departments, seeking to 
curb the negative aspects of scandals, began establishing
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special units to investigate allegations of police misconduct. 
By the 1970s, most large police departments had some type of 
formal procedure or special unit to handle complaints by 
citizens— a major recommendation of both the President's Crime 
Commission and the Kerner Commission (Klyman and Kruckenburg, 
1979? Reasons and Wirth, 1975).
These special units have been referred to as "internal 
investigations" or "internal affairs." Internal investigative 
units have the task of investigating all classes of complaints 
within the police organization whether these complaints 
involve citizens or other internal departmental problems 
(President's Commission On Law and the Administration of 
Justice, 1967). Although the police organization has held the 
position that police internal investigations provide adequate 
means for addressing citizen complaints, many criticisms of 
this position have been raised.
Both the President's Crime Commission (19 67) and the 
Kerner Commission (1968) have cited various problems with 
internal grievance mechanisms. The President's Crime 
Commission stated that...."all too often, because of misplaced 
loyalty, policemen overlookserious misconduct by other 
officers (President's Commission of Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967? p. 145)." The report further 
stated that the police agencies had not developed effective 
means by which one officer could openly file a complaint
against a fellow officer. Another problem addressed by the 
Crime Commission involved the reception of complaints within 
the police organization. It seemed that many officers 
considered individual citizen complaints as an attack on the 
whole organization as opposed to an attack against the 
individual officer. Furthermore, in one eastern city, it was 
discovered that the police had routinely charged citizens with 
filing false reports against officers which generally served 
to discourage citizen complaints. In New York City, the 
practice was to drop criminal charges of false reporting in 
exchange for not filing or withdrawing complaints. The Crime 
Commission indicated that these serious considerations made a 
mockery of effective means of settling grievances (President's 
Commission On Law Enforcement and the Administration of 
Justice, 1967).
The Kerner Commission (1968) stated that a major problem 
with internal review was that "founded" cases of police misuse 
of authority rarely meant that real discipline would be 
imposed. The Commission also stated that internal review, no 
matter how fair or equitable, could rarely provide the 
necessary public confidence or protect the police department 
from clearly "unfounded" allegations (National Advisory 
Commission On Civil Disorders, 1968? p. 162).
To overcome the problems associated with internal review, 
some in the criminal justice field began to advocate external
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review of the police. Although the Presidents Crime 
Commission (1967) did not advocate external review, the report 
supported the contention that grievance procedures were 
drastically in need of reform. Conversely, the Kerner 
Commission recommended that cities establish external 
reviewing agencies independent of the police department that 
would handle citizen complaints (National Advisory Commission 
On Civil Disorders, 1968). A significant number of citizens, 
especially those in minority groups and civil rights 
organizations, expressed the most resentment toward internal 
review procedures. These groups (i.e., Urban League, National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP]) 
became the strongest proponents for establishing civilian 
review boards (Presidents Commission On Law Enforcement and 
the Administration of Justice, 1967).
Civilian Oversight of the Police
Civilian^ review agencies date back to 194 8 when 
Washington, DC created its Civilian Review Board. Other 
cities followed Washington, DCs lead and established early 
review boards, ^ these cities included Philadelphia (1958), 
Minneapolis (1960), Rochester (1963), and New York City 
(1966). During the 1960s, civilian review boards were 
proposed, but not adopted, in Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, 
Los Angeles, Oakland, Newark, Pittsburgh, and Seattle
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(Presidents Commission On Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 200).
From the onset, civilian review ^ boards faced great 
opposition, especially from police officers and their unions.
Police agencies questioned the feasibility of having lay 
persons (without having a full understanding of police work) 
decide whether a policeman acted appropriately (Rogowsky, p 
1971). Police boards in both Philadelphia and Rochester were 
subjected to law suits where the court permanently or
temporarily disbanded their agencies. Specifically, the 
Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB) was created by 
executive order of the mayor in 1958 and abolished by lobbying 
efforts in 1967. Washington DC's board was criticized in 1965 
as being a farce and had to be thoroughly reorganized
(President's Commission of Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967). Although New York City has 
had its Civilian Complaint Review Board since 1953, the 
structure of the board has been modified on numerous
occasions. ^ Until 1966 the New York Civilian Complaint Review 
Board (CCRB) was composed of sworn staff; therefore, in the 
true sense of the word, the CCRB was not truly civilian. In 
1966, the CCRB, after reorganization to include civilians, 
was rejected by popular vote, and thereafter was restructured 
again utilizing only sworn staff members (President's 
Commission On Law Enforcement and the Administration of
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Justice, 1967) . The CCRB has since been reorganized (in 1987) 
to be composed only of civilians (IACOLE, 1989).
It should be noted that early police review boards rarely 
utilized civilians? most often, these agencies were staffed by 
command personnel or other sworn officers. These boards were 
created by executive or administrative order reflecting 
political considerations more so than public consensus. 
Civilian review agencies created in the aforementioned manner 
were often doomed when political parties or city leadership 
changed hands (President's Commission On Law Enforcement and 
the Administration of Justice, 1967).
The establishment of civilian review agencies seemed to 
further alienate the police and the community. Police unions 
vigorously campaigned against civilian review boards and, as 
previously mentioned, were successful in disbanding the Police 
Advisory Board in Philadelphia in 1967. At the same time,
community advocacy groups campaigned to extend the power of
\
these boards (Campbell et al., 1969).
These early civilian review agencies differed greatly in 
their inception, structure, and the types of cases reviewed, 
but they all had one thing in common? #they were only advisory
in nature. They had no authority to impose discipline?
rather, recommendations were made to the polie,6l_ chief. 
Classes of complaints handled by civilian review boards 
included, but were no limited to, the following: unnecessary
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or excessive use of force, false arrest, harassment, refusal 
to allow the accused to telephone his/her lawyer or family, 
indignities, loss or destruction of personal property, denial 
of medical attention, discourtesy, and illegal search. Not 
only did civilian review boards handle individual cases, some 
reviewed general departmental policies and procedures that 
presented conflicts (President's Commission On Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice, 1967).
A change occurred in the mid-1970s whereby many civilian 
review agencies were created by local ordinance as opposed to 
executive or administrative order (Loveday, 1988). Ordinances 
provide a safeguard because they generally reflect a greater 
public consensus and are, therefore, much harder to disband, 
requiring a majority of the city council and not simply by 
mayoral action.
Relatively little has been written about civilian review 
boards. Most of the literature .is of a historical and/or 
descriptive nature tracking the origins of review boards. 
Kerstetter (1985) made the first systematic attempt to 
classify civilian review agencies. I-According to Kerstetter 
the strongest form of external review is the "civilian review" 
model. In this model authority is invested in an external 
agency to investigate, adjudicate, and make recommendations. 
Kerstetter labels the "civilian input" model as the second 
level of civilian review. In this model, the external agency
is given the power to receive and investigate civilian 
complaints. The facts established by the agency are then 
turned over to the head of the police agency. The third model 
of civilian review detailed by Kerstetter is the "civilian 
monitor" defined as a procedure by which the investigation, 
adjudication, a^nd discipline is carried out by the police
department, but an external arena for review is available
p  f m < \
(Kerstetter, 1985).
I Although Kerstetter's terminology is insightful, it 
leaves some key questions unanswered. For example, in 
Kerstetter's civilian review model does the authority to 
investigate and recommend actually mean that it must happen on 
every occasion? Kerstetter's language seems to suggest that 
all those agencies with the power to investigate and recommend 
are civilian review agencies. In reality, some oversight 
agencies could be labeled civilian review agencies in error in 
that some organizations having certain powers may choose not 
to invoke them. Secondly, the civilian input model designates 
those procedures where the investigation is carried out by a 
civilian agency and the facts turned over to the police chief. 
Although there may be civilian review agencies of this type, 
it is more likely that the investigation is actually carried 
out by sworn personnel, and then, those facts are turned over 
to the external agency to make recommendations. In fact most 
civilian review agencies with the authority to investigate
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also make subsequent recommendations. Likewise, Kerstetter*s 
third model leaves some unanswered questions. In the civilian 
monitor model investiqation and adjudication is conducted 
internally, but there are external reviewing safeguards. This 
category covers procedures where there is an internal appeal 
mechanism. The civilian monitor model is overly broad. One 
must wonder what type of review? Is the review automatic? 
Who makes the judgement as to which cases to review? In this 
model the phrase "reviewing safeguards" is confusing. If 
indeed this model presents a citizen appeal procedure, much is 
left to question. As Kerstetter attempted a classification 
system, other researchers have focused on a more critical 
analysis.
Terrill (1990) critically reviewed civilian oversight 
agencies suggesting that they may well serve only symbolic a 
function. Many oversight agencies, in essence, have no real 
independent function because of lack of funds or 
administrative support. On the other hand, Terrill points out 
that civilian review provides a good checks and balance . 
system; furthermore, civilian oversight may serve as a good 
deterrent to police misconduct.
Available research fails to address some key components 
of civilian review agencies. For example, no systematic 
effort has been made to provide information on the structure, 
functioning, and prevalence of such agencies in the United
States. However, the International Association for Civilian
/Oversight of Law Enforcement (IAQOLE), a professional
/
organization of staff members of civilian review agencies, 
established in 1984, periodically publishes a compendium which 
outlines civilian review organizations in the United States, 
England, Australia, and Canada. The IACOLE compendium simply 
contains descriptive narratives of certain agencies; no 
classification attempted. IACOLE uses the term civilian 
oversight to mean any procedure whereby civilians review the 
facts or make recommendations in cases involving police 
misconduct (IACOLE, 1989). In essence, civilian review and 
civilian oversight have the same meaning and are often used 
interchangeably.
There are few studies which address the effectiveness of 
civilian review agencies and even fewer which examine the 
demographic characteristics of cities and jurisdictions where 
such agencies exist. Perez (as cited in Kerstetter, 1985) 
attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen complaint 
procedures across six different jurisdictions (the San Jose 
Odbudman's Office, the Kansas City Office of Citizen 
Complaints/Police Department, the Berkeley Police Review 
Commission, the Berkeley Police Department, the Oakland Police 
Department, and the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office). 
The Berkeley Police Review Commission and the Kansas City 
Office of Citizen Complaints were the only civilian oversight
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agencies in the study. Perez audited a very limited number of 
cases in each jurisdiction attempting to uncover the perceived 
objectivity, thoroughness, and overall fairness of complaint 
procedures.
Data suggested that the satisfaction level with the 
Berkeley Police Review Commission was significantly higher 
than the other procedures regardless of the final outcome of 
the case. The satisfaction level concerning the other 
procedures were relatively low and were related more to the 
final outcome. In the case of Kansas City, the fact that 
investigation was conducted by the police department may have 
affected the satisfaction level making the jurisdiction 
overall more comparable to internal complaint procedures 
(Kerstetter, 1985). Though the data is only suggestive, the 
indication is that civilian oversight agencies may restore 
some public confidence in the complaints process.
Research to date seems to suggest that, while public 
confidence may heightened by the existence of a civilian 
oversight agency, these agencies are less likely than internal 
procedures to substantiate police misconduct. Furthermore, 
when guilt is found by civilian oversight agencies, their 
recommendations may be more lenient than that of the police 
department (Hudson, 1971).
Although many in the criminal justice field have 
supported civilian review, none of them have presented a
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convincing argument that such agencies effectively handle 
citizen complaints against the police. However, before 
significant evaluations of civilian review agencies can be 
made, an adequate classification scheme must be established 
that addresses the qualitative differences among the various 
organizations. How prevalent are civilian oversight agencies 
in the United States, and how can they be distinguished from 
one another? The current project is offered as a basis by 
which detailed information on civilian review can be obtained.
CHAPTER 3 _
METHODOLOGY
Sample Selection
In the planning stage of this project, several sampling 
strategies were considered. Probably, the best strategy would 
have been to include all civilian oversight agencies in the 
United States, but attempting to include all oversight 
agencies would have been an onerous task if not an impossible 
one given the limited resources available for the project. 
Most scientific inquiries into prevalence rely on random 
sampling or a probability sample, but because of the various 
oversight agencies within the larger cities this strategy 
would have been inappropriate. Therefore, the major objective 
of the sampling process was to select a good sample of cities 
in the United States where prevalence and variety could be 
better observed. After careful deliberation, the 50 largest 
U. S. cities (according the Bureau of the Census, 1991) were 
selected. The primary reasons for selection of the 50 cities 
were as follows: 1) civilian oversight agencies are most
prevalent in larger urban areas, and therefore, the 50 cities 
would provide a comprehensive look at the variety and 
structure of oversight agencies, 2) research supports the fact 
that the most serious problems of police-community relations 
exist in America’s larger cities (President’s Commission of 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 19 67), and
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3) contained within the 50 cities represented are the oldest 
civilian oversight agencies in the United States (e.g., 
Chicago-OPS, Milwaukee-Police & Fire Commission, and Detroit- 
Board of Commissioners).
The Survey Instrument
Phase I. A national survey was conducted by telephoning 
police departments and/or community advocacy groups in each of 
the 50 selected cities. Respondents (police departments) were 
asked to comment on whether or not a civilian oversight agency 
existed in their city. If a oversight agency existed, the 
specific agency was contacted for verification. During the 
interviewing process the 1989 IACOLE was utilized as a guide 
in designating cities having oversight agencies contained in 
the compendium. In cities where respondents stated that no 
civilian oversight agency existed, they were asked about their 
respective citizen complaints procedures; this measure was 
taken to insure that all procedures could be evaluated more 
thoroughly.
In cities where respondents stated that civilian 
oversight agencies existed, they were questioned concerning 
the specific structure of the oversight agency (e.g., name of 
agency, date established, composition of board, who does 
initial fact-finding and/or subsequent review, etc.). A copy 
of the survey instrument is attached as Appendix B. 
Respondents were asked to forward literature on the civilian
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oversight agency in their city. Data obtained was used to 
verify survey information.
The information obtained from the self-reported data was 
either verified by literature from the agency/city or by the 
1989 IACOLE. Therefore, all information obtained was reliable 
and a valid.
Analysis of City Characteristics
Phase II. The next step in the project involved a 
comparison of city characteristics where civilian oversight 
agencies existed. Existing data was obtained from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1989), the Bureau 
of the Census (1990) , and the most recent Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics (199 0). These data were used to 
compare the cities on each of the following variables: (1)
population, (2) geographic region, (3) racial composition, and 
(4) index crime rate. Table I depicts the method by which the 
above variables were operationalized.
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TABLE I CATEGORIES OF CITY CHARACTERISTICS
POPULATION:
(1) 1,000,000 and over
(2) 500,000 to 999,999
(3) 250,000 to 499,999
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION:
Northeast
Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Rhode Island
Midwiest
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin.
South
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and 
West Virginia.
West
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Washington
MINORITY REPRESENTATION:
(1) 0-20%
(2) 21-30%
(3) 31% or more
CRIME RATE:
(1) 0-10,000 per year
(2) 10,001-15,000 per year
(3) 15,001 and higher per year
**Geographic region categories are similar to the ones 
used in the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
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As phase I focused on the prevalence, structure, and 
functioning of civilian oversight agencies in the United 
States, phase II focused on three objectives: (1) comparisons 
among cities with agencies and those without, (2) comparisons 
among cities with agencies, and (3) comparisons across 
different classes of oversight agencies in hopes that 
underlying patterns could be outlined.
CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS
Development of a Typology of Oversight Agencies
There are a variety of civilian oversight agencies 
throughout the United States. As mentioned previously, IACOLE 
(1989) periodically publishes a compendium of oversight 
agencies which contains non-systematic narratives of civilian 
oversight organizations. Although the classification system 
established for the current project parallels that of 
Kerstetter (1985), the shortcomings of Kerstetter1s 
classifications addressed earlier make the current 
classification scheme more adequate for the purpose of 
analysis.
While there are many differences in civilian oversight 
agencies in the United States, such organizations can be 
distinguished from one another by two key elements. First, 
who does the initial fact-finding (whether or not an 
independent investigation was conducted)? Second, who 
conducts the review of the facts and makes a recommendation? 
With regard to the fact-finding process, an independent 
investigation refers to investigation that is conducted 
outside the police organization and by non-sworn persons. 
Where investigation and review occur outside the structure of 
the police agency, the process is most independent, and 
civilian oversight is at its highest form.
Class I Systems are civilian agencies where the fact­
finding and subsequent review of cases alleging police 
misconduct are conducted by non-sworn persons. The Chicago 
Office of Professional Standards (OPS) and the Detroit Board 
of Commissioners are examples of Class I Systems by virtue of 
the fact that investigation and review in these agencies is 
conducted by non-sworn persons or civilians, while at the same 
time the scope and power of these agencies vary.
For the purpose of this study, three categories of 
civilian oversight have been established based on key elements 
mentioned previously. The three classifications are listed 
below:
(a) Initial investigation and fact­
finding by non-sworn persons; (b) Review 
of investigative report and 
recommendation for action by non-sworn 
person or board consisting of a majority 
of civilian persons.
(a) Initial investigation and fact­
finding by sworn police officers; ( b ) 
Review of investigative report and 
recommendation for action by a non-sworn 
person or board which consists of a 
majority of non-sworn persons.
(a) Initial investigation and fact­
finding by sworn officers; (b) Review 
of investigative report and 
recommendation for action by sworn 
officers;
(c) Opportunity for citizen who is 
dissatisfied with final disposition of 
the complaint to appeal to a board which 
includes non-sworn persons.
\ Class I:
Class II:
Class III:
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Class II Systems of civilian oversight include oversight 
agencies where the fact-finding is conducted by sworn officers 
(usually the internal affairs unit of the police department) 
and a subsequent review is carried out by non-sworn persons. 
Some Class II Systems, however, have limited investigatory 
powers. The New York Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) 
and the Indianapolis Office of Citizen-Police are designated 
as Class II Systems. In both agencies, investigation is 
conducted by sworn persons either assigned to the agency or 
working within the structure of the police organization.
Class I & II Systems are somewhat easier to isolate based 
on the two defining elements. The third and final category of 
civilian oversight (Class III) refers to procedures where both 
investigation and review is conducted by sworn officers. In 
these systems, sworn officers also make recommendations after 
reviewing the facts. The citizen may appeal the decision to 
a civilian board or agency. Complainants make formal, written 
pleas to these agencies. In Omaha the Mayor's Public Safety 
Finding Review Board hears appeals from dissatisfied citizens. 
The Omaha board consists primarily of civilians, although the 
police chief is one of the members. In Phoenix, the 
Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) hears appeals and reviews 
appropriate disciplinary measures in founded cases of 
misconduct. The DRB will also be in this category because 
there is one non-sworn person on the board.
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There are other important characteristics of civilian 
oversight agencies. Some of these elements will be discussed 
throughout this thesis. Characteristics of civilian oversight 
agencies that are important include: (1) enabling
authorization of the agency, (2) number and composition of 
members, (3) method of appointment, (4) type of cases 
reviewed, and (5) scope and power of the organization.
All but one of the existing civilian oversight agencies are 
advisory in nature. They only have the authority to 
recommend? the ultimate decision on disciplinary measures is 
most often the responsibility of the head of the police
TABLE II CITIES BY CLASSIFICATION
CLASS I:
Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, Milwaukee,
Cleveland, New Orleans, Long Beach, Oakland,
_____ Minneapolis, Honolulu, Cincinnati, Washington D.C.
CLASS II:
New York City, Houston, San Diego, Dallas, 
Indianapolis, Baltimore, Portland, Kansas City Mo., 
Atlanta, Albuquerque, Pittsburgh, Miami, Fresno,
_____ Toledo______________________________________________
CLASS III:
_____ Phoenix, Tucson, St. Louis, Omaha____________________
agency, or some other designated public official.
Prevalence
The national survey revealed that the majority of the 50 
largest cities had a civilian oversight agency of some variety 
(Table III). Thirty of the 50 cities have a civilian
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oversight procedure; the 3 0 oversight agencies constitute 60 
percent of the total sample. Civilian oversight agencies in 
the 3 0 cities are distributed by classification in the 
following manner: (1) 12 Class I Systems (40% of the total),
(2) 14 Class II Systems (46.7% of the total) and, (3) 4 Class 
III Systems (13.3% of the total) (Walker and Bumphus, 1991).
Trends
Compared to the decade of the 1970s, the decade of the 
1980s saw a dramatic increase in civilian oversight agencies. 
Only 23 percent of the sample cities had oversight agencies 
prior to 1980 as compared to the current 60 percent. Around 
77 percent of the current sample consists of oversight 
agencies that were established after 1980. Furthermore, four 
(13.3%) of the agencies in the sample were established in the 
199 0s (Table III). The data clearly reveals growth in the 
area of civilian oversight of the police. The indication is 
that the growth in civilian oversight of the police will 
continue into the 1990s.
Variety
There are great and important differences in the 
structure and procedures of the 3 0 agencies included in the 
sample. A discussion of the differences among these agencies 
will serve two important functions: (1) characteristics
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TABLE III CIVILIAN REVIEW AGENCIES
By Year of Creation***
1972 Honolulu 1984 Atlanta
1974 Detroit, Chicago 1985
1975 Omaha 1986 Phoenix, Miami, 
Pittsburgh
1977 Milwaukee, Baltimore 1987 New York City, 
Albuquerque
1979 Cincinnati 1988 San Diego, Dallas, 
Cleveland
1980 Washington, DC, 
Oakland
1989 Indianapolis, St. 
Louis, Fresno
1981 1990 Houston, Minneapolis
1982 Portland, Tucson 1991 Toledo, Long Beach
1983 San Francisco, New
Orleans, Kansas City 
MO.
***Dates represent actual year of authorization for 
agency handling of citizens' complaints.
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specific to each classification will be discussed outlining 
inclusion to each category and (2) other unique 
characteristics will be discussed indicating variability 
within classes. Each category is discussed separately for a 
more focused understanding of civilian oversight in the United 
States. A brief discussion of each classification follows. 
Class I. Systems
Twelve agencies in the sample are characterized as being 
Class I Systems. Class I Systems are those agencies where the 
initial fact-finding/investigation is conducted by non-sworn 
personnel and the review of the investigative report and 
recommendation is made by an individual who is non-sworn or a 
board with a majority of non-sworn persons.
Some general characteristics of Class I Systems can be 
identified. The majority of the Class I oversight agencies 
operate during regular business hours (although the Cincinnati 
Office of Municipal Investigation provides a after hours duty 
officer to respond to complaints). In most cities, complaints 
are received in person, in writing, on a walk-in basis. In two 
agencies (New Orleans & Minneapolis), anonymous complaints 
are received based upon the seriousness of the allegation 
(Interview, New Orleans's Municipal Office of Investigation, 
January, 11, 1991; Interview, Minneapolis Civilian Review
Police Authority, February 20, 1991). Although these
complaints can be received anonymously, complaints, at some
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point, must be reduced to writing and signed by the 
complainant. Many of the agencies are automatically provided 
copies of complaints as a matter of police internal procedure 
(neither Oakland nor Washington, DC receives complaints from 
their respective departments).
(1) Agency Jurisdiction
All of the agencies in this category have at least 
concurrent jurisdiction with their police departments 
involving those classes of complaints in which they have 
authority to handle. In the above sense, concurrent 
jurisdiction refers to the fact that the oversight agency has 
authority to initiate investigation independent of the police 
agency, often this may mean that both the police department as 
well as the oversight agency are conducting investigations 
simultaneously. The New Orleans Office of Municipal
Investigation, the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, and 
the Cincinnati Office of Municipal Investigation have original 
jurisdiction in cases alleging police misconduct. Nine of the 
12 agencies in this category review only those allegations 
filed against the police department; two agencies (New 
Orleans, and Cincinnati) review misconduct allegations brought 
against any public employee with the respective city. The 
Fire and Police Commission in Milwaukee reviews allegations of 
both the Fire and Police Departments.
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TABLE IV JURISDICTION AMONG CLASS I AGENCIES
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission:
All complaints of any type against police 
officer as well as general policy and 
procedure matters.
Oakland Citizens* Complaint Board:
All complaints of excessive force (original 
jurisdiction) Any complaint where a citizen is 
dissatisfied (appellate review).
Washington, DC Civilian Complaint Review Board:
Complaints of police harassment, excessive use 
of force, and use of language likely to demean 
the inherent dignity of any person to whom it 
was directed and to trigger disrespect for law 
enforcement officers
Cincinnati Office of Municipal Investigation:
Complaints of serious misconduct by any city 
employee and deliberate or intentional shots 
fired by police personnel. Serious misconduct 
involves-bribery, theft, improper weapons 
discharge, coercion, excessive use of physical 
force, a violation of the law, and any other 
action that may reasonably justify the 
dismissal of a public employee.
Chicago Office of Professional Standards/Police Board:
Complaints of excessive force and shots fired.
Honolulu Police Commission:
Complaints of partial attitude, discourtesy, 
threatening behavior, theft, property damage, 
unnecessary force, malicious force, excessive 
_____force and unnecessary use of a weapon._____
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Class I oversight agencies are mandated to receive and 
investigate a variety of complaints that are usually outlined 
in very broad terms and are subject to many different 
interpretations. Table IV illustrates the variety in the 
jurisdiction among Class I agencies.
All Class I agencies receive as well as investigate 
complaints. Most of the agencies have original jurisdiction 
of classes of complaints which they are authorized to handle. 
Nine of the oversight agencies investigate only those 
complaints filed with their agencies by a citizen or by their 
police departments? other complaints not brought to their 
attention are not investigated or reviewed by the agency and 
remain with police internal affairs. The Milwaukee Fire and 
Police Commission, the New Orleans Office of Municipal 
Investigation, and the Cincinnati Office of Municipal 
Investigation are among the agencies that have original 
jurisdiction over all complaints of police misconduct as 
previously mentioned.
(2) Agency Organization
The information in Appendix A illustrates the 
organization oversight agencies contained in the sample. Nine 
of the 12 agencies in this first category are boards which 
review the facts in cases and makes recommendations. The three 
remaining agencies (Cincinnati, San Francisco, and New 
Orleans) are administrative offices headed by chief executives
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who serve the same function as the review boards. These 
administrative agencies consist of trained, professional, paid 
investigators who conduct independent investigations and 
prepare summary reports under the direction of the chief 
executive member of the agency. These three agencies differ in 
that they are full-time offices whereas the boards, for the 
most part, meet periodically.
(3) Agency Powers
In all Class I agencies, the initial investigation of a 
complaint is conducted by independent investigators. One 
important component to Class I agencies is that all in the 
survey have subpoena powers. Subpoena powers authorize the 
agency to sequester the presence of witnesses during hearings 
who are most centrally involved in the issue at hand. The 
assurance through subpoena powers that appropriate persons 
involved in specific cases appear before the deliberating body 
is essential to disclosing all pertinent information. 
Although all Class I agencies have subpoena powers, there is 
no consistent pattern in terms of the scope of subpoena 
powers. For example, only the Cincinnati Office of Municipal 
investigation, the New Orleans Office of Municipal 
Investigation, and the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission 
can assure the mandatory presence of law enforcement officers 
at adversarial proceedings. Most agencies depend upon the
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voluntary co-operation of witnesses, especially on the part of 
police officers.
Class I Systems make recommendations based on a 
preponderance of the evidence. Only one of these agencies has 
the power to impose discipline (Milwaukee). There are
several variations in the form in which recommendations are 
made. Most agencies use the standard terms such as "founded" 
(meaning misconduct was found), "unfounded" (meaning no 
instance of misconduct was found), "sustained" (meaning some 
infraction has occurred), and "unsustained" (meaning evidence 
does not prove the allegation one way or the other). Other 
agencies use the terms such as "substantiated", 
"unsubstantiated", "exonerated", and "unfounded". Oakland 
finds a complaint as either "substantiated" or 
"unsubstantiated." Washington DC's Civilian Complaint Review 
Board either "sustains", "dismisses", or finds that misconduct 
has occurred (Petito, 1986). The recommendation made by these 
agencies are forwarded to the head of the police agency, the 
city manager, or mayor; recommendations are not usually 
binding. In the case of Milwaukee's Fire and Police 
Commission, the agency is an executive oversight agency of the 
police department; therefore, the determination is binding. 
Where the Milwaukee's Fire and Police Commission finds 
misconduct, discipline can be imposed (Petito, 1986).
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Eleven of the 12 agencies in this category were created 
by local ordinance. These agencies are monitored by the city 
council and mayor. The Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission 
was established by state statute making the Commission unique 
among Class I agencies.
(4) Selected Class I Agencies
(a) Introduct ion
Below are brief narratives of three Class I oversight 
agencies designed to illustrate the variety of agencies in the 
Class I category. New Orleans' Municipal Office of 
Investigation, Chicago's Office of Professional Standards 
(Police Board), and Detroit's Board of Commissioners are 
outlined.
(b) New Orleans/Municioal Office of Investigation
The New Orleans Office is of Municipal Investigation 
(OMI) was established in 1980 and authorized by local 
ordinance. The Office authorized to investigate complaints of 
alleged illegal or improper conduct on the part of any 
municipal employee (IACOLE, 1989).
Presently, the OMI consists of 7 full-time employees, all 
civilians. The OMI has a Chief Investigator who reports 
directly to the Chief Administrative Officer of the city. OMI 
investigations are limited to improper or illegal conduct; 
therefore, minor decrepancies are handled inter­
departmentally. However, the OMI is responsible for the
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routing of minor decrepancies to the appropriate department. 
Any citizen except those employed by the agency can file a 
complaint with the OMI. The OMI conducts adversarial hearings 
and has the authority to subpoena witnesses, papers, and 
effects. The hearings conducted are open to the public and 
afford both parties the opportunity to present witnesses and 
testimony to the board (IACOLE, 1989).
(c) Chicago/Police Board
The Chicago Police Board was established by local 
ordinance in 1961, and in 1974 the board first began to review 
citizen complaints against the police. The board is comprised 
of 9 citizens who are volunteer appointees confirmed by the 
city council and brought forth my the mayor. Under the 
authority of the Police Board, the Office of Professional 
Standards is empowered to receive all complaints of excessive 
use of force and use of firearms. All other complaints are 
handled through police internal investigations (IACOLE, 1989).
Unlike most Class I agencies, the OPS is housed within 
the Chicago Police Department, although the office is not 
responsible to the Chief of Police. The OPS employs all 
civilian investigators who conduct independent investigations 
and submit investigative reports to the Police Board. The 
Police Board deliberates and files recommendations with the 
Superintendent of Police. The Chicago Police Board hears all
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cases assigned to it by the Superintendent of Police and Law 
Department (Petito, 1986).
(d) Detroit/Board of Commissioners
The Detroit Board of Commissioners was created by 
ordinance in 1974. The Board consists of five members 
appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city council. The 
Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI), acting under the 
authority of the Board of Commissioners, receives and 
investigates complaints involving force, arrest, entry search, 
harassment, demeanor, procedure, service, and property. The 
OCI provides a investigative summary to the Board of 
Commissioners (IACOLE, 1989).
The Board of Commissioners receive only those 
complaints in the above mentioned categories. All
recommendations made by the Board of Commissioners are 
presented to the Chief of Police for disciplinary action 
(IACOLE, 1989).
(e) Summary
All three agencies outlined are ones where civilians play 
a major role in two crucial areas— investigation and review of 
the facts. The OMI (New Orleans) has original jurisdiction 
over all complaints of improper conduct involving any city 
employee while the Chicago Police Board and the Detroit Board 
of Commissioners considers allegations of police misconduct 
brought before them. One might argue that the OMI is a much
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more effective agency based on the comprehensive structure of 
the its organization. Others might argue of the OPS that 
being housed in the Chicago Police undermines its authority. 
Regardless of the arguments that may surface, the 
organizations in the Class I category represent agencies where 
there is an independent investigation of the facts followed by 
a independent review made by civilians.
Class II Systems
Class II Systems are defined as those systems where the 
initial fact-finding/investigation is conducted internally by 
sworn officers and a review of the facts is made by an 
individual or a board with a majority of non-sworn persons. 
Class II agencies make up a majority (46.7%) of the agencies 
in the sample. Since there in no independent evaluation of 
the facts, Class II agencies by their very nature constitute 
less of an independent process. Class II agencies are 
dependent upon the police department for interpretation of 
the facts.
(1) Agency Jurisdiction
As in Class I Systems, Class II agencies review various 
classes of complaints. Unlike Class I Systems, the types of 
complaints seem to involve what many might consider the more 
traditionally serious allegations. The categories of 
complaints in Class II agencies deal with actions that cause 
the greatest community controversy such as excessive force,
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TABLE V JURISDICTION AMONG CLASS II AGENCIES
Civilian Complaint Review Board/New York City:
Complaints of Unnecessary or excessive force, 
abuse of authority, discourtesy, language or 
conduct which is derogatory of a person's race, 
sex, religion, creed, national origin, or 
sexual orientation.
Civilian Review Board/Atlanta:
Complaints of excessive force, serious bodily 
injury, or death.
Civilian Review Committee/Houston:
Complaints of excessive force, serious bodily 
injury, or death.
Citizen's Police Review Board/Dallas:
Complaints of serious bodily injury or death.
Complaint Evaluation Board/Baltimore:
Complaints of discourtesy and excessive use of 
force.
Office of Professional Responsibility/Pittsburgh:
__________ Complaints of improper or illegal conduct.______
serious bodily injury, or discrimination of the basis of race,
sex, national origin, etc. Jurisdiction is much more limited
in Class II agencies. Table V illustrates the variety in
jurisdiction among Class II agencies. While there is less
variability in the types of cases reviewed in Class II Systems
(primarily the more serious cases), the structure of Class II
agencies show greater variability than the former
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classification.
Most Class II agencies in the sample have jurisdiction in 
cases involving police employees. Pittsburgh's civilian 
oversight agency, the Office of Professional Responsibility, 
reviews cases involving any municipal employee. In contrast, 
several Class I agencies have the authority to review cases 
involving any employee of the municipality.
(2) Agency Organization
Nine Class II agencies in the sample employ a board or 
committee which reviews an investigative report prepared by 
the police department. Five of the 14 agencies have somewhat 
differences structures. In Fresno, the Ombudsman's Office, 
one designated individual, conducts a subsequent review of the 
facts. Likewise, in Albuquerque, the Independent Counsel, one 
individual, reviews police investigative reports and makes 
recommendations concerning disciplinary actions. Pittsburgh's 
Office of Professional Responsibility, headed by a chief 
executive officer, reviews complaints of misconduct filed 
against any public employee and makes recommendations. In 
Miami, the Office of Professional Compliance reviews the facts 
of misconduct cases and often makes additional investigation 
before making any recommendations. Finally, the Office of 
Citizen Complaints (OCC) in Kansas City, headed by an 
executive director, reviews all complaints of police
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misconduct filed either at the OCC or at the police 
department.
f 3) Agency Powers
The majority of Class II agencies have no subpoena 
powers. The 1989 IACOLE Compendium cites the New York City 
Civilian Complaint Review Board as the only agency in this 
category having subpoena powers (IACOLE, 1989).
Recommendations in Class II agencies are handled in much 
the same way as in Class I agencies. After the agency makes 
recommendations, those recommendations are then sent to the 
police chief, city manager, mayor, or some other designated 
individual. None of the Class II agencies have the authority 
to impose discipline.
(4) Selected Class II Agencies
(a) New York/Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB1 
The New York CCRB is a board composed of 12 members (6 
civilians selected by the city council and 6 selected by the 
police department). The CCRB was created by local ordinance. 
The Board is a reviewing body that is responsible for 
reviewing cases alleging improper conduct on the part of 
employees of the New York Police Department. The CCRB has 
five satellite offices (one in each borough of the city) 
(Petito, 1986? p. 26). The CCRB reviews allegations 
involving: unnecessary or excessive force; abuse of authority; 
discourtesy? and language or conduct which is derogatory to a
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individual's race, sex, creed, national origin, or religion 
(Petito, 1986; p. 26).
Like several other agencies, the CCRB has a conciliation 
process for allegations of less serious in nature. The CCRB 
does have subpoena power. After the case has been reviewed 
the CCRB makes its recommendations known to the Police 
Commissioner (IACOLE, 1989).
(b) Pittsburah/Office of Professional Responsibilitv-OPR 
The OPR was established in 1986 by local ordinance. The 
office is supervised by a civilian assistant chief who reports 
directly to the Director of Public Safety. One other staff 
member, an investigator/coordinator, is also a civilian. The 
OPR conducts a review of all allegations of misconduct within 
the Department of Public Safety. The OPR does not accept 
complaints phoned in or made anonymously (refer to Appendix 
C) .
The civilian assistant chief upon the receipt of the 
investigative report makes recommendations to the Director of 
Public Safety. OPR does not, however, make recommendations as 
to discipline. Recommendations are made based on a 
preponderance of evidence and indicate whether or not the 
complaint is sustained, unsustained, founded, or unfounded 
(refer to Appendix C).
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(c) Baltimore/Complaint Evaluation Board(CEB^
The CEB is a seven-member board made up of high-ranking 
government officials established by state statute in 1977. 
All members of the CEB are agency heads or their designated 
substitutes. Complaints of discourtesy and excessive force 
are reviewed by the board. All complaints must be in writing, 
signed, and notarized. The board is mandated to review police 
internal investigations and to make written recommendations to 
the Police Commissioner. The CEB has no formal subpoena 
powers. Dispositions by the CEB include: sustained, dismissed 
because of lack or insufficient evidence, exonerated because 
of the complainants failure to prove clear and convincing 
evidence, and remanded for further investigation. Complaints 
can be taken by any number community agencies throughout the 
Baltimore area as well as the Police Department (refer to 
Appendix C).
(d) Summary
Class II Systems are totally dependent upon police 
internal investigations for the finding of facts. Some Class 
II Systems have limited investigative powers; only the New 
York CCRB has subpoena powers. Regardless of whether police 
internal investigation provide adequate depictions of the 
facts, there is substantial civilian input involving Class II 
oversight agencies.
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Class III Systems
Some oversight agencies have civilian input at the 
appellate level. Admittedly, these procedures are less 
automatic and much less independent. Class III Systems are 
those;where both the initial investigation and fact-finding is 
conducted internally by sworn officers, but a procedure allows 
for an appeal to a body consisting of a civilian element. The 
four agencies in this category are substantially different 
from one another. All the agencies represent appeal 
procedures, but their similarities end there. The be£t 
approach to describing these agencies is to present a brief 
narrative of each.
(1) Category III
(a) Phoenix/Disciplinarv Review Board(DRB)
The DRB was established by administrative order in 1986 
to provide the Police Chief an advisory body to assist him in 
giving stability, consistency, and fairness to the 
disciplinary review process. It is within the DRBs authority 
to review disciplinary reports, refer such reports back to 
unit commanders for further investigation, and recommend the 
degree and severity of disciplinary action in founded cases. 
The board has the authority to conduct hearings and subsequent 
evaluations (refer to Appendix C).
Any employee automatically has the right to appear before 
the DRB when an allegation may lead to demotion, suspension,
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or dismissal. The DRB is composed of an Assistant Chief, two 
Captains, one employee peer, and one citizen of Phoenix. 
Clearly, it is debatable as to whether the civilian element in 
this process is significant; nevertheless, there is a civilian 
element in the appeal procedure (refer to Appendix C).
(b) Omaha/Public Safety Findings Review Board
In cases where citizens are dissatisfied with the outcome 
a of departmental investigation in Omaha, the Mayor's Public 
Safety Findings Review Board is available. The Mayor's board 
was established by executive order in 1975. In order to 
utilize the Public Safety Findings Review Board, a complainant 
must submit objections in writing to the Mayor within ten days 
of receiving his/her letter of disposition from the Chief of 
Police (refer to Appendix C).
The Mayor's board is composed of eight members: the
Mayor, the Public Safety Director, the Chief of Police, the 
Human Relations Director, the City Attorney, one member of the 
City Council, and two citizens appointed by the Mayor. The 
board has access to all reports filed by the Omaha Police 
Department concerning the specific case. In cases selected, 
the Mayor's board may present an alternate recommendation to 
the Police Chief for consideration (refer to Appendix C).
(c) St. Louis/Board of Police Commissioners
As in Omaha, St. Louis has a appeal procedure in cases 
where citizens remain dissatisfied with final dispositions.
62
The St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners was created by 
state statute and consists of four citizens appointed by the 
governor and confirmed by the Senate. When an appeal is 
filed, the Secretary to the Board of Police Commissioners 
determines whether the complainant has presented sufficient 
evidence to reconsider the case. In cases where the decision 
of the Secretary is that the case was improperly investigated, 
it is returned to internal affairs for further investigation. 
After further investigation, the Board of Commissioners may 
recommend an alternate disposition if justified (refer to 
Appendix C).
(d) Tucson/Citizens-Police Advisory Committee 
The Citizens-Police Advisory Committee was created by 
ordinance in 1990. The committee consists of 13 members of 
which two are sworn officers below the rank of sergeant. All 
members are citizens of Tucson. The ultimate goal of the 
advisory committee is to assist the police in achieving a 
greater understanding of the nature and causes of complex 
community problems, especially as they relate to police- 
community relations and minority groups (refer to Appendix C.)
Although the advisory committee has a number of symbolic 
functions, the two functions that justify its inclusion in the 
Class III category are as follows: the committee has the
authority to request that the police department review the 
disciplinary actions taken in deciding cases that cause great
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community controversy or discourse. The committee also has 
the authority to use certain incidents and/or dispositions as 
a vehicle for examining police policies, priorities, and 
procedures. The Citizens-Advisory Committee acts upon the 
direction of the Mayor and City Council. The committee 
usually reviews all cases of a controversial nature and makes 
alternate recommendations if they are needed (refer to 
Appendix C).
(e) Summary
It becomes apparent by observing the variety of agencies 
in this category that their differences are great. To what 
extent there is an independent review of cases in this 
category is subject to greater scrutiny than in the previous 
two categories. Class III Systems outline those agencies 
where civilians have some input only in the appellate process. 
These agencies constitute the lowest level of civilian 
oversight contained in the sample.
Explaining Type and Prevalence
In an attempt to explain prevalence, this section of the 
investigation employed several demographic variables: 
population, geographic region, minority representation, and 
index crime rate. Crosstabulations were run using the 
existence of a oversight agency as the dependent variable by 
the preceding independent variables. Due to the fact that the 
expected cell frequency in all crossbulations was less than 5
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cases, no adequate tests of significance were conducted. 
Differences among categories of 10 percent or greater (in 
cases where a pattern was evident) were accepted as suggestive 
and in some cases relational. The preceding rule of 
association has been recognized as an appropriate one (Babbie, 
1989) .
Population. Utilizing the most current Bureau of the 
Census Statistics (1991), each city in the sample was placed 
in one of the following population categories: (1) 1 million
or over, (2) 500,000-999,999, and (3) 250,000- 499,999. Not 
surprisingly, cities with a population of 1 million or over
TABLE VI CITY POPULATION BY CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
POPULATION BY 100,000
1,000,000 + 500-999,999 250-499,999
% N % N % N
NON-CIVILIAN 25.0 2 52.9 9 36.0 9
CLASS I 25.0 2 29.4 5 20.0 5
CLASS II 50.0 4 11.7 2 32.0 8
CLASS III 0.0 0 5.8 1 12.0 3
*U. S. Department of Commerce, 1991.
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were much more likely to have a civilian oversight agency. 
Only 25 percent of the cities (Philadelphia and San Antonio) 
in the sample with a 1 million plus population had no civilian 
oversight procedure. Furthermore, oversight agencies among 
the larger cities were exclusively in the first two 
classifications. Although cities with a population on 1 
million plus seemed more likely to have a civilian oversight 
agency, the data suggested that cities in the third population 
category (250,000-499,999) were more likely than those in the 
second (500,000-999,999) to have an oversight agency (Table 
VI) .
The inference is that when a city reaches a certain 
population level the likelihood increases that they will have 
a civilian oversight agency. On the other hand, some cities 
with substantially larger populations than third category 
cities had no civilian oversight procedure.
Geographical Region. With regard to geographical region, 
the findings seem to be most suggestive (Table VII). Cities 
located in the Midwest seemed much more likely to have a 
civilian oversight procedure (91.7%) than cities in the South, 
Northeast, or West. Furthermore, 50 percent of the Midwest 
agencies were in the Class I category. In contrast, Southern 
cities had the least number of oversight agencies (31.3%) 
percent). There seemed to be no clear pattern in the 
Northeast and Western regions.
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TABLE VII GEOGRAPHICAL VARIABLES BY CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
AGENCY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
TYPE
NORTHEAST MIDWEST SOUTH WEST
% N % N % N % N
NON-CIV. 42 .8 3 8.3 1 68.7 11 33 . 3 5
CLASS I 14.2 1 50.0 6 6.2 1 26.6 4
CLASS II 42.8 3 25.0 3 25.0 4 26.6 4
CLASS III 0.0 0 16. 6 2 0.0 0 13.3 2
*SourceBook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1990
Minority Representation, Minority representation
included all individuals classified as non-white in 50 of the 
sampled cities (the Honolulu minority representation may be 
misleading in that the majority of those in the city have 
Asian backgrounds). Minority representation refers to the 
composition of the metropolitan statistical area; therefore, 
some percentages may be more or less representative of the 
actual city population. The statistical reporting areas were 
used due to the fact that the most current information on 
minority representation refers to these areas.
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TABLE VIII CITY MINORITY REPRESENTATION BY CIVILIAN 
OVERSIGHT
MINORITY REPRESENTATION
10-20% 21-30% 31% >
% N % N % N
NON-CIVILIAN 45.0 9 43.7 7 28.5 4
CLASS I 15.0 3 12.5 2 50. 0 7
CLASS II 25.0 5 37.5 6 21.4 3
CLASS III 15.0 3 6.2 1 0.0 0
*U. S. Department of Commerce, 1991.
Since minority citizens file more complaints in 
proportion to their total population than do their white 
counterparts, one might expect that cities with substantially 
higher minority representation would have more oversight 
agencies. The findings from this research support the 
preceding expectation, with cities with the highest minority 
representation having more oversight procedures. Table VIII 
reveals that cities in the third category (31 percent or 
more) were three times more likely to have an oversight 
procedure.
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Crime Rate. Differences in the index crime fate seemed 
to have something to do with whether an oversight agency 
existed in a city. Although both high crime rate cities and 
low crime rate cites had a variety of Class I & II agencies, 
generally, cities with the higher crime rates had more civlian 
oversight agencies (Table IX)«
TABLE IX INDEX CRIME RATE BY CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
CRIME RATE (ANNUALLY)
0-10000 10001-15000 15001 & MORE
% N % N % N
NON-CIVILIAN 47.6 10 39.1 9 16.6 1
CLASS I 19.0 4 30.4 7 16.6 1
CLASS II 28.5 6 21.7 5 50.0 3
CLASS III 4.7 1 8.6 2 16.6 1
*U. S. Department of Commerce, 1991.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
Implications of Findings
There has been substantial growth in the area of civilian 
oversight of the police in recent years. This apparent growth 
seems to be continuing into the decade of the 1990s as 
evidenced by four agencies in the sample which were created in 
this decade. Evidence suggests that civilian oversight 
agencies have become more stable in that agency creation is 
typically by ordinance as opposed to early boards which were 
created by administrative or executive order. One may infer 
from the growth in civilian oversight that many jurisdictions 
have become more receptive to external review practices.
The variety of oversight agencies across jurisdictions is 
very apparent. Although the established classification scheme 
aids in our ability to make generalizations, there remains 
differences among these agencies that must be addressed. 
Hopefully, differences among oversight agencies can now be 
discussed in respect to a meaningful classification.
The limited descriptive analysis of the variables of 
population, geographical region, minority representation, and 
crime rate provides suggestive inferences as to the evolution 
of civilian oversight procedures. The strongest suggestions
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from these variables indicate that the Mid-western region may 
be more receptive to civilian oversight and that high 
percentages of minorities in the population may designate 
cities that are more likely to have an external review agency. 
However, it should be noted that cities in the sample with 
relatively low minority populations also have oversight 
agencies, Minneapolis and Indianapolis are two examples of 
such cities.
Limitations of Research
This research is limited in that it primarily addresses 
the prevalence of oversight agencies. Selection of the 50 
largest U. S. cities as a sample prevents inclusion of other 
noted civilian oversight agencies in the country. Civilian 
oversight agencies exist in Rochester, NY; Hartford, CT; 
Berkeley, CA; Flint, MI; San Diego County, CA; Dade County, FL 
(IACOLE, 1989); and, Allen County, IN (Petito, 1986).
Admittedly, the suggestive analysis obtained by looking 
at city characteristics in relation to the existence of 
oversight agencies provides no statistical significance. The 
small number of cases in the sample preempt any meaningful 
evaluation of these characteristics (population, geographical 
region, minority representation, and crime rate).
The descriptive analysis contained in this thesis only 
begins to answer some of the questions concerning civilian 
review of the police. The classification scheme provides a
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good foundation for viewing the variety and structure of 
civilian oversight agencies in the United States, but the 
research merely scratches the surface. Research must 
ultimately focus on some of the more qualitative issues in 
this area.
The Need for Further Research
External review of the police was proposed primarily for 
two reasons: to restore public confidence in the police and
to provide an objective means of handling citizen complaints 
against the police (National Advisory Committee on Civil 
Disorders, 1968)? both considerations must be taken into 
account when discussing the effectiveness of civilian 
oversight. Is the public more confident as a result of more 
widespread civilian oversight? Do these agencies provide a 
more equitable or efficient means of handling citizen 
grievances against the police?
In order to answer the question concerning effectiveness, 
comparative analysis must be directed toward measurements of 
citizens* perceptions of civilian oversight. Public opinion 
surveys can answer the question of whether citizens relate 
positively to oversight agencies. Surveys can also be useful 
in discovering to what extent citizens are aware of oversight 
agencies in their communities. Are cities making efforts to 
make the citizens* complaint process easily accessible to the 
public?
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Comparative analysis of complaints including 
investigation, review, and recommendations may be one way of 
checking effectiveness. This type of inquiry should provide 
information indicating both the positive and negative 
components of external review of the police. Audits of 
significant numbers of citizen complaints across different 
jurisdictions would provide information indicating to what 
extent there is agreement between the independent agency and 
the police agency.
Many of the dynamics of civilian oversight agencies go 
beyond simple inclusion into one of the three categories. 
Although the current classification system offers insight into 
agency organization and structure, other variables need to be 
addressed independently respective to classification. 
Research must compare statutory powers among oversight 
agencies (i.e., subpoena powers, investigative and 
disciplinary powers).
Civilian review of police procedures has seen rising 
acceptance in the United States in the last two decades. It 
remains to be determined if these new structures are, indeed, 
enhancing the quality of police services or are simply window 
dressing to placate citizens.
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APPENDIX B
Name of Department_________________   Date.
• •••
Person Contacted_____________;______ ■,
My name is . Currently we are conducting a national
survey on citizen police civilian review here at the University of 
Nebraska in Omaha.
Does your department have a procedure for review of citizen 
complaints?
"■ ' •' /  : ’ P . . . .
; 7’'""’ "v TP ™  :. : XB_a» • ;
- i .
What is the name of your procedure? >
What date was it established?.
Where there any prior procedures?
Who does the initial factfinding?
If a board, by what authority is the board or director 
appointed?
If a board, does the board consist of sworn or non-swom 
officers?
If a board, how many board members are there, and are full­
time, part-time, paid, or unpaid?
Is the specific complaint in question investigated or does 
the procedure review only the equity of how the complaint 
5Ls handled through departmental channels?
IF HQ. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A CITIZEN HAS A COMPLAINT? 
Is. there an internal complaint procedure?
What happens if a citizen is still unhappy?
Is there a review or appeal procedure? (Explain)
*Could you send me a copy of your civilian review 
procedure/citizen appeal procedure and an annual report to:
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
Department of Criminal Justice 
60th & Dodge Streets 
Omaha, NE 68182
APPENDIX C
® i t «  o f
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Office of Professional Responsibility 
(4121 255-2804
Vic Bumpus
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA 
Criminal Justice 
60th & Dodge Streets 
Omaha, Nebraska 68182
Dear Hr. Bumpus:
Pursuant to your request, the following background in­
formation is provided.
In 1986, the Office of Professional Responsibility was 
formed. The office is supervised by a civilian assistant 
chief who reports directly to the Director of Public Safety.
One other staff member, an investigator/coordinator, is also 
a civilian. Additionally, we have a police sergeant, two (2) 
detectives and two (2) police officers. As I mentioned to you, 
we conduct all misconduct investigations in the Department of 
Public Safety, and also perform all background checks on 
prospective Public Safety employees.
This involves approximately 1,000 Fire Bureau members, 
1,100 Police Bureau Members, 160 Emergency Medical Service 
members, 80 Bureau of Building Inspection members, and 250 
members in the Administration Bureau/including detention offi­
cers, identification personnel and communications staff.
In 1990, we received a total of 276 complaints (for 
all Bureaus). Of these complaints, 344 were completed (this 
includes cases open from the prior year); 72 of the 344 were 
closed as sustained (or establishing that misconduct did occur).
Most of our complaints are civilian initiated. They 
must be filed in writing with this office; we accept no 
phoned-in complaints, nor do we accept anonymous complaints.
^Ennsylbanta,
February 6, 1991
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sam e manner a s  other members of the Baltimore City Police Department. Any*person 
who is a member of the Baltimore City Police Department shall be given credit for all 
the purposes aforesaid for all time spent as a member of the said Park Police Division. 
(P.LL, 1969. se c . 16-40. 1961. ch. 290.)
COMPLAINT EVALUATION BOARD
16-41. Created; members and powers.
(a) The Complaint Evaluation Board (C.E.B.) of Baltimore City is created to provide 
a permanent, statutory agency in Baltimore City through which complaints lodged by 
members of the general public regarding alleged acts of discourtesy and ex cessiv e  
force by personnel of the Police Department of Baltimore City are to be processed  and 
evaluated.
(b) The Board is com posed of the following members or their delegates:
(1) The State's Attorney of Baltimore City
£2) The Attorney General of Maryland
(3) The City Solicitor of Baltimore City
(4) The Police Commissioner of Baltimore City
(5) The Executive Director ol the Legal Aid Bureau. Inc., of Baltimore City
(6) The Executive Director of the Maryland Human Relations Commission
(7) The Executive Director of the Baltimore City Community Relations 
Commission.
(c) The City Solicitor of Baltimore City shall be the permanent chairman. The 
representative of the Legal Aid Bureau shall serve as secretary.
(d) The Board shall meet in executive session as often as necessary to perform its 
functions and duties, but it shall meet not less than once a month.
(e) In all matters where a quorum is present, a majority vote of the Board shall 
prevail. A quorum consists of 5 members. (1975. ch. 889.)
16-42. Complaint procedures.
(a) Any person who claims to have been subjected to. or any person who claims to 
have personal knowledge of an act or acts of discourtesy, use ol excessive  lorce. or 
injury allegedly resulting from excessive force caused by Police personnel, may make 
a complaint of such conduct et the Office of the Internal Investigation Division ol the 
Police Department of Baltimore City, the Legal Aid Bureau, the Maryland Human 
Relations Commission, the Baltimore Community Relations Commission, or at any of 
the Police District Stations.
(b) The complaint shall be reduced to writing on a special C.E.B. Form serially 
numbered, signed by the complainant, and notarized before a duly authorized Noiary 
Public.
(c) One copy of the com pleted form shall be retained by the recipient ol the 
complaint and a copy given to the complainant. A copy hall be mailed within 46 hours 
to the Internal Investigation Division and to the Secretary of the Board
rdf The Secretary of the Board shall assign a consecutive num ber to ea ch
POLICE DEPARTMENT
complaint and. within 48 hours, shall mail a copy to each  member of the Board. The 
Secretary shall also maintain on file a record of each  complaint.
(e) The Internal Investigation Division shall make a comprehensive investigation of 
each  complaint and submit its report thereof to the Board within 90 days from the date 
of the complaint.
(I) The Board shall review the Internal Investigation Division's report and submit in 
writing to the Police Commissioner within 30 days from receipt thereof, a statement of 
its findings and recommendations a s  provided under Section 16-43(b). The Police 
Commissioner shall, within 30 days of his receipl of the findings and recommendations 
of the C.E.B. forward to the Board a statement of his disposition in each  ca se . 
Concurrent with this, the Police Commissioner will also forward a Copy of the Board's 
recommendalion and the Police Commissioner's statement of disposition to the 
complainant and respondent police personnel. (1975. .ch. 889.)
16-43. Jurisdiction and disposition of complaint.
(a) Jurisdiction of the Board shall extend only to complaints against police 
personnel with respect to discourtesy and use of excessive lorce as defined by Police 
Department rules and regulations.
(b) Upon review of the investigative report of each  case , the Board shall make 
forthwith any one of the following four recommendations to the Police Commissioner:
(1) Sustain the complaint and approve, disapprove or modify the proposed 
Internal Investigation Division's action against the police personnel.
(2) Dismiss the complaint because of lack or insufficiency of evidence.
(3) Exonerate the police personnel because  of the com plainant's failure to prove 
his c a se  by clear and convincing evidence.
(4) R em and the c a se  lor further investigation to the Internal Investigation Division 
or to the Maryland State Police.
(c) The Board may request the complainant, w itnesses, and the police departm ent 
personnel involved in a particular complaint to submit voluntarily to a polygraph test or 
lo appear voluntarily before the Board. (1975. ch. 889.)
16-44. Final action.
The Police Commissioner has final decision-making responsibility for the 
appropriate disciplinary action in each  case , but no final action may be taken until the 
recom m endation of the Board has been reviewed. (1975. ch. 889.)
16-45. R ights not abrogated.
Nothing contained in this article may abrogate any constitutional, statutory or 
com m on law right ol police personnel against whom a complaint is filed, nor of the 
com plainants, investigalors or w itnesses who participate in the complaint procedure. 
(1975. ch. 889.)
GENERAL ORDER NO. B-2 DISCIPLINE, MISCONDUCT AND INVESTIGATION PAGE 7
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2. I. (3) If the division ocssmander agrees with the recxamendation for sus­
pension or demotion or dismissal, he will forward the report to 
the Disciplinary Review Board Chairman, after insuring that the 
matter has been fully and adequately investigated, and all per­
tinent questions have been answered and documented.
(a) In those cases when an officer is referred to the Discipli­
nary Review Board and the investigation was conducted by the 
Internal Affairs Bureau, the officer may request a meeting 
with the Internal Affairs investigator to discuss the matter 
to be reviewed by the DRB. The officer will not be permitted 
to read the investigation nor will any copies be made avail­
able for review.
(b) The request shall be made in writing to the officer's im­
mediate supervisor. It will be the immediate supervisor's 
responsibility to contact the Internal Affairs Bureau
and set a date for the officer, the Internal Affairs inves­
tigator, and the supervisor to meet and discuss the matter 
prior to the DRB. The officer, if he chooses, may be 
acocnpanied by a unit representative.
J. When the investigation is completed, the accused employee will be 
notified in writing of the findings.
3. DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BTARD: This board is established to provide the Police 
Chief with an advisory board to assist in giving stability, consistency, 
fairness and timely information to the department's disciplinary process. 
The board is authorized to review disciplinary reports, refer such reports 
back to unit commanders for further investigation and to recommend the 
degree and severity of disciplinary action to the Police Chief. The board 
will not conduct hearings or investigations.
A. The board will consist of an Assistant Chief, two (2) Captains, one (1) 
employee peer, and one (1) citizen of Phoenix. An Assistant Chief will 
chair the board on a rotating basis.
B. The board will review ell disciplinary reports in which a suspension, 
demotion or dismissal has been approved by a division commander and 
ell reports of an employee being cited for driving a vehicle while 
under the influence. When an employee is involved in a serious viola­
tion of the law or the rules and regulations of the department to the 
extent that the violator could be immediately dismissed from employ­
ment, a supervisor may immediately and directly refer the matter to 
the Police Chief, or his designee, for action. Such a referral will 
bypass the Disciplinary Review Board.
(1) The involved employee shall have the right to appear before the 
departmental Disciplinary Review Board when the disciplinary 
matters brought before the board may lead to demotion, suspension 
or dismissal.
90
GENERAL ORDER NO. B-2 DISCIPLINE, MISCONDUCT AND INVESTIGATION PAGE' S
OF CITIZENS' COMPLAINTS 8/90
3. B. (1) (a) The purpose of such appearance is to give the employee an op­
portunity to respond to any sustained assertions made against 
him.
(b) The department shall notify the employee ten (10) calendar 
days prior to the board meeting. The notification shall 
contain the date, time, violation(s), and basis of each 
violation that has been partially or wholly sustained.
(c) The employee may meet with his immediate supervisor along 
with his second level supervisor, or the employee's bureau/ 
precinct commander to discuss the matter being reviewed
by the board. The employee may be accompanied by a unit 
representative at the meeting.
(d) If the immediate supervisor conducted the investigation, the 
employee may meet with the next supervisor in his chain of 
command. Such a request shall be made in writing to the 
employee1 s immediate supervisor. The employee may be accom­
panied by a unit representative at the meeting.
(e) The employee may appear before the board, with a unit repre­
sentative of his choosing, to state his reasons why the pro­
posed action is unjustified.
(f) The employee may submit relevant written matter in support of 
his position.
(g) Any appearance before the board during the employee's reg­
ular work shift shall be counted as time worked. Employees 
are not eligible for overtime pay when appearing before the 
board during other than regular work shift hours.
C. After review, the board will arrive at a recommendation, including the 
number of hours in cases of suspension, and submit it to the Division 
Commander.
(1) Such recommendations are advisory only.
(2) If the board disagrees with the recommendations submitted by the 
Division Camramander, and feels the disciplinary actions should be 
less severe than a suspension, demotion or dismissal, they will 
return the report to the Division Commander who may proceed with 
action as provided under General Order B-2, paragraph 2.1., or 
submit the matter directly to the Police Chief for further consid­
eration.
(3) The recommendations of the board will be included in the permanent 
records of the disciplinary report.
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commissioners shall hold office for their term of appointment and until their successors 
shall have been appointed and qualified. In case of a vacancy in said board for any cause 
whatsoever, it shall be filled by appointment for the unexpired term, in the same manner 
as in the case of original appointments. The governor shall issue commissions to the 
persons so appointed, designating the time for which they are appointed in case the 
appointment is to fill an unexpired term occasioned by death, resignation or any other 
cause, and whenever the term of office of any commissioner expires, the appointment of 
his successor shall be for four years. The commissioners now holding offices under 
existing laws in any city of this state to which sections 84.010 to 84.340 apply are to hold 
their offices until the expiration of their terms, and their successors are duly appointed' 
and qualified.
(Amended by L.1987, H.B. No. €61, § A.)
1987 Legislation
The 1987 amendment modified the terms of 
commissioners and provided for apr'0'r,trr<»nts to 
fill vacancies beginning on January 9, 1989.
84.040. Police commissioners— qualifications— term of office— oath— compensation
The said commissioners shall be citizens of the state of Missouri, and shall have been 
residents of the cities for a period of four years next preceding their appointment; they 
shall, except as specified in sections 84.030 and 84.080, hold their offices for four years, 
and until their respective successors shall have been appointed and qualified, and receive 
each a salary of one thousand dollars per annum, payable monthly; before entering upon 
the duties of their said offices, the said commissioners and the said mayor shall take and 
subscribe before a circuit or associate circuit judge of the circuit court of judicial circuit in 
which said cities shall be located, or the clerk thereof, the oath or affirmation prescribed 
by the Constitution of the state of Missouri, and shall also take and subscribe before the 
same judge or clerk the further oath or affidavit that in any and every appointment or 
removal to be made by them to or from the police force created and to be organized by 
them under sections 84.010 to 84.340, they will in no case and under no pretext appoint or 
remove any policeman or officer of police, or other person under them, on account of the 
political opinions of such police officer or other person, or for any other cause or reason 
than the fitness or unfitness of such a person, in the best judgment of such commission­
ers, for the place for which he shall be appointed, or from the place from which he shall 
be removed. The said oaths or affirmations shall be recorded and preserved among the 
records of the said circuit court.
(Amended by L. 1978, p. 736, § A (§ 1), eff. Jan. 2, 1979; L.1987, H.B. No. 661, § A.)
1987 Legislation
The 1987 amendment inserted “sections 84.030 
and” following “except as specified in” in the 
first sentence.
84.050. Board of police, treasurer— a p p o in tm e n t—tenure— bond (St. Louis)
Ohe of their number shall, from time to time, be appointed by the said commissioners 
treasurer of said board of police; and his appointment, when made, shall be certified to by 
the clerk of the circuit court of the judicial circuit in which said cities shall be located, 
under the seal of said court. Said treasurer shall hold his office for such time as may be 
designated by the commissioners, who may remove him at pleasure. Before he enters 
upon the duties of his office as treasurer, he shall give bond to the state of Missouri, with
one Or more sureties, in the penalty of ten thousand dollars, conditioned for the faithful
discharge of his duties as treasurer of the board of police, and for the faithful application 
and payment over, pursuant to the order and direction of said board, of all moneys which 
may come to his hands as such treasurer. The bond of the treasurer shall be approved by 
a circuit judge of the judicial circuit in which said cities shall be located and shall be 
delivered to and safely kept by the treasurer of said cities.
(A m e n d e d  by  L. 1978, p. 737, § A (§ ]). e f f .  -Jan. 2. 1979.)
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Title o f  Act:
An Act relating to certain public offices. 
L1971, p. 149.
CHAPTER 84. POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN ST. LOUIS 
AND KANSAS CITY
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ST. LOUIS 
Section
84.175. Police reserve force authorized, powers 
and duties— riots or emergencies, 
may appoint additional members.
Cross References 
Arrest without warrant on suspicion, see 
§ 544.216.
Bertillon system of prisoner identification, see 
§ 217.315 et seq.
Criminal records, central repository, duty of 
police to report certain information, see § 43.503.
Educational grants, surviving children of offi­
cers and employees killed in the line of duty, see 
§ 173.260.
Library References 
Municipal Corporations «=181.
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 564.
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide fol­
lowing the Preface.
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ST. LOUIS
84.010. City ordinances not to conflict with powers of board of police commission­
ers—-emergency (St. Louis)
Law Review Commentaries 
A Missouri plan for public employee collective 
bargaining. Keltner W. Locke, 23 St. Louis U.L. 
J. 62 (1979).
N o tes  o f  D e c is io n s
1. Validity 
The City of St. Ix>uis has no authority to 
require that officers of the police force, of such 
city, hired after a specified date, reside within 
the city. Op.Attv.Gen. No. 276, Williams, 10-16- 
72.
2. In general
State's retention of control over St Louis po­
lice force is legal. Slater v. City of St. Louis 
(App.1977) 548 S.W.2d 590.
3. Ordinances
City ordinance, which is designed to prevent 
lead poisoning in dwelling units and which in 
effect makes it unlawful not to remove lead 
paint, as defined, within 14 days after due and 
specific notice is given, is not unconstitutionally 
vague on theory' that it does not adequately 
describe “nature of the offense charged and 
when the violation" occurs. City of St. Louis v. 
Brune (Sup.1975) 520 S.W.2d 12.
84.020. Board of police commissioners— members— officers (St. Louts)
N o tes o f  D e c is io n s
1. In general 
Claim against board of police commissioners 
for assault and battery and false imprisonment 
allegedly committed by three police officers was
based on negligent or wrongful performance of 
governmental function, and thus was tort action 
to which doctrine of sovereign immunity applied 
whether board was considered as municipal 
agency or state agency. Carmelo v. Miller (App. 
1978) 569 S.W.2d 365.
84.030. Police commissioners, appointment— term of office— vacancies— (St. Louis)
Beginning on January 9. 1989. the governor of the state of Missouri, by and with the 
advise and consent of the senate, shall appoint the four commissioners provided for in 
section S4.020, and one commissioner shall be appointed for a term of one year; one 
commissioner shall be appointed for a term of two years; one commissioner shall be 
appointed for a ter:;; of throe years; one commissioner shall bo. appointed for a term of 
four years. Their su'.v-’.'sors shah each be appointed for a term of four years, and saio
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BOARDS, 
COMMITTEES, & 
COMMISSIONS
CmZENS-POLICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CREATED BY:
Tucson Code, See. 10A-S6 eLseq.
MEMBERS:
13 members: T ie  Mayor and each Council Member shall appoint one (1) member of 
the Committee. The Fraternal Order o f Police, Lodge No. 1, shall nominate for 
appointm ent by the Mayor and Council, two (2) m em bers from the Police 
Department who hold a rank no greater than sergeant. T he Tucson Crime 
Commission shall nominate, for anpointment by the Mayor and Council, one (1) 
member. The Tucson Human d e la tio n s  C om m ission  sh a ll nom inate, for 
appointment by the Mayor and Council, one (1) member. The City Manger and the 
Chief o f Police, or their designated representatives, shall be continuing ex-officio, 
non-voting members.
QUORUM:
6 members (must be voting members)
QUALIFICATIONS:
Appointed members must be residents of the City of Tucson and shall not have ever 
been convicted of a feiony.
TERMS OF OFFICE:
The terms of the members appointed by Mayor and Council shall be coterminous 
with the appointing official or until their successors have been appointed. Other 
members shall serve two year terms.
CITY OF TUCSON
Office of Clfy Clerk
JUL2, 1990
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CITIZENS-POLICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
' PAGE TWO
FUNCTIONS:
(a) Consult with the governing body from time to time as may be required by the 
Mayor and Council.
(b) Assist the police in achieving a greater understanding of the nature and causes of 
complex community problems in the area of human relations, with special emphasis 
on tne advancement and improvement of relations between police and community 
minority groups.
(c) Study, examine and recommend methods, approaches and techniques to 
encourage and develop an active citizen- police partnership in the prevention of 
crime.
(d) Promote cooperative citizen-police programs and approaches to the solutions of 
community crime problems, emphasizing the principal that the administration of 
justice is a responsibility which requires total community involvement.
(e) Recommend procedures, programs and/or legislation.to enhance cooperation 
among citizens of the community and police.
(f) Strive to strengthen and ensure throughout the community the application of the 
principle of equal protection under the law for all persons.
(g) Consult and cooperate with federal, state, city and other public agencies, 
commissions and committees on matters within the committee’s charge.
(h) The committee may ask for and shall receive from the Police Department, a 
review of action taken oy the Department in incidents which create community 
concern or controversy.
(i) The Committee shall have the authority, should^ it so desire, to use a specific 
incident as a vehicle for the examination of police policies, procedures and priorities.
(j) At the discretion and express direction of the Mayor and Council, assume and 
undertake such other tasks or duties as will facilitate the accomplishment of these 
goals and objectives, except as hereinafter provided.
OPEN PUBLIC MEETING LAW REQUIREMENTS':
This public body, although a subcommittee or advisory committee, has been directed 
by the Mayor and Council to file written minutes with the City Clerk. It should be 
noted that the minutes filed need not necessarily contain the sam e information 
specified under the open public meeting law.
SUPPORTING DEPARTMENT:
Administrative/Secretarial - City Clerk 791-4213/3224
